The facts in Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, or the “Habitual Drunkard” Case, are straightforward; its concern with medical and legal definitions, like that of “habitual drunkard,” are just the opposite. Police in Carlsbad, California arrested Salomon Ledezma-Cosino, a Mexican native and illegal immigrant to the United States, for driving under the influence and with a suspended license. The Department of Homeland Security then issued a notice to appear, charging Ledezma-Cosino with removal under the appropriate subsection of Title 8 of the United States Code, section 1229. On the advice of counsel, Ledezma-Cosino admitted his illegal status and related details, qualifying him for deportation.
Ledezma-Cosino then petitioned for a cancellation of removal per 8 USC §1229b(b)(1), which specifies that one criterion for the revocation of removability is that the illegal immigrant in question was “a person of good moral character” for the decade up until the application for revocation of removability. Pursuant to 8 USC §1101, the immigration judge evaluated whether Ledezma-Cosino was a “habitual drunkard,” one of the disqualifying criteria to be a “person of good moral character.” The immigration judge found that Ledezma-Cosino was indeed a habitual drunkard, and thus ordered his deportation.
The case was appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, where it was first heard by a three-judge panel. The case’s controversy lay in the medical science behind alcoholism and the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause. The Ninth Circuit’s three-judge panel ruled that, in accordance with American Medical Association guidelines since 1956 and with other medical literature, alcoholism was a disease or mental condition, rather than a choice. The panel further found that habitual drunkenness was a symptom of alcoholism and could not be separated from the medical condition. Thus, a qualification against habitual drunkards in this case was a qualification against alcoholism—and the Ninth Circuit panel found such qualification against a medical condition to violate the Fourteenth Amendment clause guaranteeing every person equal protection under the law.
In an en banc ruling, however, the court reversed that earlier three-judge decision and gave a new three-part decision. First, the court found that there was significant evidence to support the assertion that Ledezma-Cosino was a habitual drunkard. The court recognized statements from doctors treating Ledezma-Cosino, which testified that the man drank “1 liter of tequila per day on the average,” and statements from Ledezma-Cosino’s daughter, who recalled her father’s liver failure from excessive alcohol consumption.
Second, the court ruled that the term “habitual drunkard” was not unconstitutionally vague, as it lent itself to factual inquiry. The court pored over a few dictionary definitions of “habitual drunkard,” because the United States Code fails to define it, but found that there is consensus on the definition. The court also pointed to Ledezma-Cosino’s habits and unequivocally finds his consumption meeting any reasonable person’s conception of habitual drunkard.
Third, the court ruled that the “habitual drunkard” provision was not a violation of equal protection under the law, using the rational basis review test. The court found a compelling state interest in removing from society illegal immigrants that are habitually drunk, because their behaviors pose a danger to society. In his dissent to the original three-judge panel ruling, Judge Richard R. Clifton noted that alcoholism was a medical condition, but that individuals with alcoholism still possessed free will, writing, “If chronic alcoholics really had no ability to control their conduct, then such individuals would never be able to stop drinking. We know that is not the case, as Ledezma himself laudably demonstrated. Chronic alcoholics do not have to be habitual drunkards.” In other words, Judge Clifton argued that there is a distinction between habitual drunkenness and alcoholism, which the en banc opinion affirms as well.
The Supreme Court, in a decision consistent with prior case law, has denied Ledezma-Cosino a writ of certiorari and affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning and judgment in ruling against Ledezma-Cosino. In 1988, the highest court in the land ruled in Traynor v. Turnage that the Veterans’ Administration’s (which later became the Department of Veterans Affairs) characterization of two recovered alcoholics’ former alcoholism as “willful misconduct” and subsequent decision to deny the two extensions of time to use their GI Bill benefits did not violate § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits federal discrimination against handicapped individuals on the basis of their handicap. Furthermore, the distinction between consumption of alcohol and being an alcoholic is codified in federal statutes—even the Americans with Disabilities Act recognizes that, while alcoholics are protected under the ADA, the use of alcohol is not.